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trophoresis (PFGE) analysis demon-
strated these to be a unique clone dis-
tinct from Asian and American clini-
cal strains (5).
In July 2004, a V. parahaemolyti-
cus outbreak of 80 illnesses occurred
in A Coruña, Spain. All the case-
patients attended weddings in the
same restaurant. V. parahaemolyticus
was isolated from stool samples of 3
patients. The outbreak isolates were
characterized by serotyping, poly-
merase chain reaction (PCR) for
species-specific genes (Vp-toxR and
tlh), virulence-related genes (tdh and
trh), and group specific (GS)-PCR (a
PCR method to detect the pandemic
clone). Two isolates belonged to the
serotype O3:K6, while the remaining
isolate was O3:K untypeable. All 3
isolates had the toxR,  tlh, and tdh
genes, lacked the trh gene, and were
positive for the GS-PCR assay to
detect pandemic strains. These results
unequivocally linked the outbreak iso-
lates to the O3:K6 pandemic clone of
V. parahaemolyticus. To confirm the
relationship with the pandemic clone,
the outbreak isolates were additionally
subjected to DNA fingerprinting
analyses. PFGE and arbitrarily primed
PCR analyses showed that these iso-
lates exhibited a pattern indistinguish-
able from those of pandemic strains
from Asia. The epidemiologic investi-
gation associated with the outbreak
identified the boiled crab eaten in the
restaurant as the most probable source
of the infection. Live crabs were
imported to Spain from the United
Kingdom, processed under unhealthy
conditions, and stored at room temper-
ature for several hours before they
were eaten. All the seafood eaten at the
weddings was harvested in Europe,
and no imported food was eaten or
handled in the restaurant.
Pandemic O3:K6 clone of V.  para-
haemolyticus appeared in Asia around
1996 (6). Since its emergence, it has
accounted for most V. parahaemolyti-
cus infections in Asia. It spread to the
United States in 1998 (7) and more
recently to Chile (8), where it has
caused hundreds of infections, result-
ing in the first V. parahaemolyticus
pandemic in history (9). We report the
first evidence that it has been intro-
duced to Europe. The emergence of
this virulent serotype in Europe is a
public health concern and emphasizes
the need to include V. parahaemolyti-
cus in microbiologic surveillance and
reexamine control programs for shell-
fish-harvesting areas and ready-to-eat
seafood.
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Q Fever and 
the US Military
To the Editor: Q fever is a
zoonotic disease caused by the rick-
ettsialike organism Coxiella burnetii.
The disease has a worldwide distribu-
tion and can infect many different
species, although cattle, sheep, and
goats are the primary reservoirs (1).
Transmission to humans usually
occurs by inhaling dust or aerosols
from infected animals, and approxi-
mately half of infected persons mani-
fest clinical symptoms. In acute Q
fever infection, the 3 main sets of
symptoms are flulike syndrome,
pneumonia, and hepatitis (2,3).LETTERS
Q fever has military relevance not
only in its potential use as a bioterror-
ism agent, but also because of the risk
for natural infection in deployed mili-
tary personnel. Thousands of cases of
Q fever have been seen in military
personnel since the disease was first
reported in the 1930s (4). Since the
most common mode of transmission
is airborne, personnel do not need to
have direct contact with infected ani-
mals to be exposed.
C. burnetii was first recognized as
an infectious disease threat to US mil-
itary troops serving in Iraq in 2003
during a pneumonia outbreak investi-
gation. Nineteen cases of severe pneu-
monia, including 2 deaths, occurred
from March 1 to August 20 (5). Acase
was defined as occurring in a patient
with bilateral alveolar infiltrates that
required intubation and mechanical
ventilation. This investigation
involved extensive serologic testing
for possible infectious causes of pneu-
monia, including C. burnetii. Of 19
patients with severe pneumonia tested
for  C. burnetii, 3 had positive anti-
body titers by immunofluorescence
assay (IFA). No other infectious cause
was confirmed for the remaining
cases of pneumonia. Although C. bur-
netii was not determined to be the
cause of the pneumonia outbreak, the
finding of 3 patients with positive
antibody titers launched an effort to
ascertain other cases of Q fever
among military personnel who served
in Iraq during that time.
Approximately 62 cases of pneu-
monia, both severe and nonsevere,
occurred in Iraq from March 1 to
August 20, 2003. A pneumonia case
was defined as occurring in a patient
with a chest radiograph suggesting
pneumonia and >1 of the following
symptoms: fever, cough, or shortness
of breath. The Defense Medical
Surveillance System (DMSS) was
queried to determine how many
patients had both predeployment and
postdeployment serum samples avail-
able for Q fever testing. The Army
Medical Surveillance Activity, which
operates DMSS, also maintains the
Department of Defense Serum
Repository and stores serum from
service members after mandatory
HIV testing and deployment process-
ing (6). Predeployment sera must be
collected within the year before
deployment.
Twenty-two soldiers had prede-
ployment and postdeployment sera
available; samples were tested for
phase I and phase II antibody to Q
fever by using IFA. Results showed 5
additional soldiers in whom pneumo-
nia was diagnosed while serving in
Iraq and who seroconverted to C. bur-
netii before postdeployment serum
draws (Table). All predeployment
antibody titers for both immunoglob-
ulin (Ig) G and IgM were negative in
these 5 soldiers, with an IFA titer of
1:16 as a cutoff.
The initial 3 Q fever patients ascer-
tained through the pneumonia out-
break investigation were extensively
interviewed for possible exposures.
All 3 patients first experienced symp-
toms while in northern Iraq and
reported contact with domestic ani-
mals, including dogs, cats, sheep,
goats, and camels. Two of the patients
reported tick bites within 30 days
before becoming ill, and 1 reported
drinking raw sheep’s milk. The 5
other patients who became ill with
pneumonia also first sought care
while in northern Iraq. Predeployment
sera from these 3 patients were also
tested for C. burnetii by IFA, and all
samples were negative for both IgG
and IgM. 
Extremely limited information is
available on Q fever disease preva-
lence in Iraq, either in animals or
humans. Iraq is primarily an agricul-
tural country, and nomadic herding
takes place countrywide, except in the
northernmost regions and along the
eastern border, where adequate land is
available for grazing livestock. The
most common livestock in Iraq are
cattle, sheep, and goats (7). Although
herds of infected animals may exist in
any region of Iraq, larger concentra-
tions of livestock may exist in north-
ern areas, where land is suitable for
ruminants to graze. This concentra-
tion could lead to a higher risk for
transmission to humans because the
chance of contact with infected ani-
mals would be greater.
These data indicate the potential
importance of C. burnetii as an infec-
tious disease threat to US military
troops in Iraq. Healthcare providers
should include Q fever in their differ-
ential diagnosis of community-
acquired pneumonia and consider
adding doxycycline to a combined
antimicrobial drug regimen to pre-
sumptively treat severe pneumonia.
Future studies to be completed
include case ascertainment to locate
US troops who were infected with Q
fever while in Iraq and in whom pneu-
monia or other clinical manifestations
of illness may have developed.
Research was conducted in compli-
ance with the Animal Welfare Act and
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other federal statutes and regulations relat-
ing to animals and experiments involving
animals and adheres to principles stated in
the Guide for the Care and Use of
Laboratory Animals, NRC Publication,
1996 edition.
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Anaplasma 
phagocytophilum,
Sardinia, Italy 
To the Editor: Anaplasma phago-
cytophilum (formerly  Ehrlichia
phagocytophila), a tick-transmitted
pathogen that infects several animal
species, including humans (involved
as accidental “dead-end” hosts), is the
causative agent of human granulocyt-
ic anaplasmosis (HGA). It is a
pathogen of veterinary importance
responsible for tickborne fever of
ruminants and for granulocytic
anaplasmosis of horses and dogs
(1,2). HGA was first described in the
United States in 1994 (2) and is
emerging in Europe (3). Although
only 2 human cases have been report-
ed in Italy (4), serologic and molecu-
lar findings have shown A. phagocy-
tophilum  infections in dogs and
Ixodes ricinus ticks (5). Incidence,
prevalence, and public impact of
HGA and horse granulocytic anaplas-
mosis are, therefore, unknown for this
geographic area. From 1992 to 1996,
an average rate of 13.4 cases/year/
100,000 inhabitants of tick bite–relat-
ed fever of unknown etiology has
been reported on the island of
Sardinia, Italy, which is considerably
higher than the corresponding nation-
al average value of 2.1 cases/year/
100,000 inhabitants. Moreover, 117
cases of tick bite–related fever, whose
etiology remains obscure, have been
reported from 1995 to 2002 in the
central west coast area of the island.
Local newspapers occasionally report
deaths as a result of tick bites,
although no HGA-associated deaths
have been documented in Europe.
This study investigated A. phago-
cytophilum in Sardinia. From 2002 to
2004, veterinarians based on the cen-
tral west coast of the island were
instructed to collect EDTAblood sam-
ples when a suspected case of tick
bite–related fever was found at their
clinics. A total of 70 blood samples
were collected from 50 dogs and 20
horses that showed tick infestation
and symptoms consistent with tick-
borne disease, such as fever, anorexia,
jaundice (only in horses), anemia,
myalgia, and reluctance to move.
Genomic DNA was extracted from
the buffy coat obtained by centrifuga-
tion of 2 to 4 mL of blood, as previ-
ously described (6). Furthermore,
DNA was extracted from 50
Rhipicephalus sanguineus ticks
removed from 30 dogs. Primers
EphplgroEL(569)F (ATGGTATGCA-
GTTTGATCGC), EphplgroEL (1193)
R (TCTACTCTGTCTTTGCGTTC),
and EphgroEL(1142)R (TTGAGTA-
CAGCAACACCACCGGAA) were
designed and used in combination to
generate a heminested polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) for the selective
amplification of 573 bp of the groEL
gene of A. phagocytophilum. The final
50 µL PCR volume of the first PCR
round contained 5 µL of the DNA
extraction, primers EphplgroEL
(569)F and EphplgroEL(1193)R, and
HotMaster Taq DNA polymerase
(5u/µL, Eppendorf) according to the
manufacturer’s basic protocol
(Eppendorf AG, Hamburg, Germany).
Heminested PCR was performed by
using 5 µL of each of the first PCR
products and primer EphgroEL
(1142)R. To confirm the PCR diagno-
sis, amplicons were digested with the
HindIII restriction endonuclease (pre-
dicted digestion pattern: 3 fragments
of 525 bp, 21 bp, and 27 bp).
Anaplasma phagocytophilum DNA
was obtained from strain NCH-1 and
used as positive control in PCR reac-
tions. Sequences were obtained by
cloning the PCR products into the
pCR2.1-TOPO vector (Invitrogen
S.R.L., Milan, Italy) and using the
ABI PRISM Big Dye Terminator
Cycle Sequencing Ready Reaction
Kit (Applied Biosystems, Foster City,
CA, USA), according to the protocols
supplied by the manufacturers.
Sequences (AY848751, AY848747)
were aligned to the corresponding